



Migration from Africa to Italy: Trends and policy responses

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issues, challenges and response strategies"

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Outline

- I. Key trends in African migration to Italy
- II. 2011 as a turning point
- III. European policy responses to the 2015-2016 “refugee crisis” and implications for African migration
- IV. The challenges ahead of us

African migration in a “new” immigration country: **key trends**


- Contrary to other major European destinations, African migration to Italy started in the late 1970s and 1980s, in a largely post-industrial and not immediately post-colonial context
- During the 1990s and early 2000s, Italy experienced massive inflows of demand-driven labour migration...
- ... BUT the political transition in Eastern Europe and the process of EU enlargement facilitated intra-European migration, while legal avenues for African migration were radically reduced

2011: What changed and what didn't

- Pre-2011: The key role of Khaddafi's Libya in European external migration strategies
- Immediate and medium-term impact of 2011 conflict in Libya
- Since 2013, major surge in “mixed flows”, but migration geography not radically transformed: continuities and discontinuities in migration systems (Nigeria vs. Guinea)


Migrants arrived (apprehended/rescued) in Italy (2009-2016)

(Source: Min. Interior)




Dead and missing migrants (Central Med- route, 2009-2016)

(Sources: Fortress Europe until 2013, IOM 2014-2016)



**West Africa as
main source of
irregular arrivals
to the EU in 2017**



Source: Frontex

European policy responses and implications for African migration

- Failure of attempts at dealing with the crisis through internal redistribution of asylum seekers
- Increasing (but asymmetrical) prioritization of external responses (containment and prevention)
- **Three geopolitical axes** of this external strategy:
 - Turkey and “Balkan route”: the “statement” of March 2016
 - Priority sending/transit countries in SSA: Partnership Framework of June 2016 + Trust Fund
 - Central Mediterranean Route and upgrade of cooperation with/in Libya (particularly since summer 2017)


Specificity of the situation along the 'Central Mediterranean route'

- Flows along Central Med Route: **low recognition rates**, at best forms of humanitarian protection
 - BUT also **low return rate**
- Large-scale exclusion + growing public hostility


Great variations in flows composition

(1st instance decisions, 2017 Q2 – Source: Eurostat)


Germany (165 265 decisions)




France (27 105 decisions)




Italy (19 160 decisions)




Austria (14 160 decisions)



Sweden (13 435 decisions)



UK (6 435 decisions)




■ Refugee status ■ Subsidiary protection ■ Humanitarian reasons ■ Rejections

High inflows + low recognition rates + low return rates = **Growing public anxiety**

Are immigrants a threat for public order and security?

(Source: Demos & Pi 2017)



3 key challenges ahead of us

- Reconciling migrants' fundamental rights and European migration control concerns, starting from Libya
- Channeling massive investments (together with political and intellectual resources) in large-scale and long-term strategies to reduce pressure on irregular channels by creating opportunities in loco
- Not bending to undifferentiated negative perceptions of migration and migrants, committing to a long-term cultural and political struggle to expand channels of legal mobility and migration within and across our two continents

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Thank you!